ABSTRACT In this paper we argue that the answer, to the question of whether Africa's recent growth is sustainable, is yes. Our optimism rests on the finding that differences in the level of institutional quality predict cross-country variation in African economic growth during the period 1995-2011. This finding is quite robust. It holds in OLS, LAD and 2SLS settings; it holds for different measures of institutions and different measures of economic growth; and it holds for the period before and the period after the global financial crisis. We also show that changes in institutional quality predict cross-country variation in African economic growth. Moreover, if we split our sample into two equally sized groups, a high-growth and a lowgrowth group, then the high-growth group has experienced a statistically significant increase in institutional quality, whereas the low-growth group has not. Overall, this makes it probable that institutions have played an important part in Africa's recent growth acceleration. The continent has seen many false dawns, caused in large part by increases in commodity prices, but a growth acceleration driven by institutions is likely to signify a genuine African takeoff.
Introduction
Much has been said about the rise of the BRIC countries and the economic performance of several smaller Asian countries. As of late, however, Africa has joined the club of fast-growing regions. The IMF's World Economic Outlook (October 2012) projects Africa's real GDP growth for 2013 to be 5.7%. With average real growth rates in the advanced economies running at 1.3%, the African growth acceleration has caught widespread attention. 1 A recent McKinsey Global Institute report on Africa speaks of 'lions on the move', while the Economist (April 6, 2013) sees in Africa the 'hottest frontier' in terms of foreign investment. The new Chinese president stated in a recent speech in Tanzania -which, by the way, was part of his first overseas trip as head of state -that the 'African lion is galloping faster and faster.' 2 For a continent that has experienced temporary growth accelerations before, caused in large part by fluctuations in commodity prices, a key question is whether the recent one is any different. Or, to put it differently, is Africa's recent growth sustainable?
The sustainability question is presently the focus of an active debate. In its recent survey of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Economist (March 2, 2013) captures the poles of the debate quite well. There are the 'boosters', who proclaim the dawn of an African century; and there are the 'skeptics', who see foreign investors as not lifting but looting the continent. 3 The debate about growth sustainability is surely not made easier by the fact that economists have no theory of sustained economic growth.
In this paper we cautiously side with the optimists; that is, we argue that Africa's recent growth is likely to be sustainable. Our optimism rests on the finding that differences in the level of institutional quality predict cross-country variation in African economic growth during the period 1995-2011. This finding is quite robust. It holds in OLS, LAD and 2SLS settings; it holds for different measures of institutions and different measures of economic growth; and it holds for the period before and the period after the global financial crisis. We also show that changes in institutional quality predict cross-country variation in African economic growth. Moreover, if we split our sample into two equally sized groups, a high-growth and a low-growth group, then the high-growth group has experienced a statistically significant increase in institutional quality, whereas the low-growth group has not. Overall, this makes it probable that institutions have played an important part in Africa's recent growth acceleration. A consistent finding of two decades of economic research is that institutions matter for economic development (see Acemoglu, 2009 , Chapter 4, for a survey). Better institutions will encourage entrepreneurs to invest in capital and ordinary people to invest in human capital (Johnson, Ostry, & Subramanian, 2007) . Better institutions will also increase the likelihood of a smooth adjustment following an adverse shock, which otherwise could derail a nascent growth takeoff. Indeed, research has demonstrated that poor macroeconomic policy tends to reflect underlying institutional challenges (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2003) . 4 Our paper is related to a recent literature that explores the factors explaining Africa's recent growth success. Beny and Cook (2009) have studied Africa's growth during the period 1960 to 2005. They show that property rights correlate with economic growth in Africa, but their main message is one of export growth. Leke, Lund, Roxburgh, and van Wamelen (2010) argue that two-thirds of Africa's growth came from internal structural changes, including government action to improve macroeconomic conditions and undertake microeconomic reforms to create a better business climate. Arbache and Page (2010) study Africa's growth between 1974 and 2005. They find that the recent growth was propelled by the rapid global demand for natural resources; and they also find a structural break in African GDP growth in the mid-1990s. Our paper is complementary to these papers in a number of respects: for instance, we use adjusted GDP data. More specifically, as suggested by Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012) , we combine PPP GDP data with night time lights observed from space in order to reduce measurement error. Moreover, our observation window begins in 1995, when there is a structural break in African GDP data (cf. Arbache & Page, 2010) , and it ends in 2011. This enables us to demonstrate that institutions have the same predictive power on both sides of the global financial crisis of 2007/2008; a finding that squares quite well with the view that better institutions increase the likelihood of a smooth adjustment following an adverse shock (Johnson, Ostry, & Subramanian, 2007) .
Our paper is also related to the literature on long-run growth and development; a literature in which the view that institutions are the fundamental cause of development has been backed by a large amount of empirical research (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Easterly & Levine 2003; Hall & Jones 1999; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004) . By and large, the modus operandi of this research has been to regress the level of income per capita on (exogenous variation in) institutional quality and various controls. The logic is that institutions change very slowly, so if one conditions on initial income, as in a standard growth regression, or includes fixed effects, it may be very difficult or impossible to uncover an effect from institutions to economic growth. That is, institutions are not generally expected to have discernible short-run effects. Our results show that this is not always so.
Finally, the paper is related to the policy literature that criticizes the singular focus on institutions and institutional reform. This literature emphasizes that it amounts to a best-practice model, which presumes that it is possible ex ante to settle on a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements (bestpractices), and that convergence towards these institutional arrangements is attractive (Bromley & Yao, 2006; Evans, 2004; Rodrik, 2006) . This literature also emphasize that a singular focus on institutions and institutional reforms ignores the existence of country-specific binding constraints, 5 and, by extension, a sense of reform priority. Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) present empirical evidence that they interpret as being consistent with a generic presence of countryspecific binding constraints. 6 Finally, critics hold that the focus on best-practice institutions does not fit well with the fact that many 'growth miracles' are characterized by 'heterodox' institutional arrangements (Rodrik, 2006) . 7 Our results warn against an excessive emphasis on country-specific binding constraints and heterodox institutional arrangements.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our main empirical approach. Section 3 presents our results pertaining to the period prior to the global financial crisis, while Section 4 presents post crisis results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Approach
We explain Africa's recent economic growth using a standard growth regression framework. Besides initial real GDP per capita, we control for institutions and natural resources. Institutional quality is a deep determinant of economic performance in the following sense: good institutions ensure the enforcement of property rights, put constraints on the actions of politicians and other commanding groups, and ensure some degree of equal opportunity for broad segments of society (Acemoglu, 2009) . Indeed, poor macroeconomic policy often reflects underlying institutional deficiencies (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001) . At the same time, we know that several African countries have benefitted substantially from high commodity prices during the period under consideration. According to the Economist, during the period 2000-2008 around a quarter of Africa's growth came from higher revenues from natural resources (Leke, Lund, Roxburgh, & van Wamelen, 2010 , argue that it was one-third). Whatever the case, high commodity prices stimulate growth in the short run regardless of institutional quality and so natural resources should be accounted for in the growth 5 Collier (2007) provides an illustrative example of the country specificity of binding constraints. Bangladesh and Chad both have endemic corruption. Yet despite being a very corrupt country, Bangladesh has experienced decent growth. Chad, on the other hand, has not done well. According to Collier, this is due to differences in opportunities. Bangladesh is a resource-scarce, coastal, lowincome country. Its development path is clear: export labor-intensive manufactures and services. This development strategy is not very demanding in terms of government. Not so for Chad, an oilrich, aid-abundant, landlocked, low-income country. Chad is not well located for exporting, and to make good use of aid and oil requires a reasonably good government. That is, Chad's government must do more than 'do-no-harm'; it must really do some good. Corruption is thus much more harmful for Chadians than for Bangladeshi. In other words, corruption is a binding constraint in Chad, but not in Bangladesh. 6 Specifically, they claim that growth accelerations are mainly caused by idiosyncratic, and often small-scale, changes; and they argue that this is consistent with the idea that a set of country specific binding constraints may in fact be holding down economies' growth rates. 7 Some authors also emphasize the importance of building reforms on pre-existing institutions and making reforms incentive compatible (Qian, 2003; Rodrik, 2006) . regression. Consequently, we estimate the following standard growth regression:
where g i is the average annual growth rate of real income per capita over the period 1995-2007 (we turn to the period 2008-2011 in Section 4). 8 We follow the lead of Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012) in producing adjusted real GDP per capita growth rates by employing satellite data on night time lights observed from space. Briefly, the growth observations used below are a convex combination (weight: 0.5) of observed real (chained PPP) GDP per capita growth (from Penn World Tables 7.0) and the fitted values from a regression of this variable on growth in nightlights. This adjustment is intended to reduce measurement error (for details, see Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil, 2012) .
We use two different measures of institutions. First and foremost, we follow Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) in using the composite rule-of-law indicator, due to Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, 9 for the year 2001 as our institutional quality measure (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010) . According to Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) , the year 2001 approximates for institutions in the 1990s, i.e. initial institutions in our sample period. The rule of law indicator captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 10 It is a standardized measure, which varies between −2.5 (weakest institutions) and 2.5 (strongest institutions). In our sample, the range is between −1.50 (Guinea-Bissau) and 1.23 (Namibia).
While much of the literature on institutions and development has relied on the rule of law index, we would surely take more comfort if similar results emerge when using an alternative institutions measure. An obvious alternative, which is available through the World Development Indicators and which is one of 30 underlying sources used in the construction of the rule of law index, is the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index. 11 Here we focus on the 'CPIA public sector management and institutions cluster average' (1 = low to 6 = high), which includes property rights and rule-based governance, quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of public administration, and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector. The CPIA measure is not available before 2005, so we settle for that year. In our sample, CPIA ranges from 2.2 in Togo (the bottommost) and 3.9 in Cape Verde (the topmost).
We will use a measure of total natural resource rents (% of GDP) in 2007. It measures the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents, and forest rents, where rents are the difference between the value of production at world prices and their total costs of production. This variable is taken from World Development Indicators (2011).
Finally, to ensure conformity with the literature on comparative economic development, we instrument the level of institutional quality using the fraction of the population speaking a primary European language as their first language (eurfrac). This instrument was proposed by Hall and Jones (1999) in their pioneering study of the role of institutions in economic development and subsequently used in an influential study by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) . 12 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables.
Main Results
Table 2 reports our regression results when we employ the rule of law indicator. The dependent variable in columns 2 to 4 is nightlight adjusted real GDP per capita growth over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] ; in column 1 we use unadjusted growth in real (PPP) GDP per capita for reasons of comparison. We immediately note that the R-squared is somewhat higher with adjusted growth, cf. column 2. This is fully consistent with the notion that adjusted growth reduces measurement error. Moreover, with adjusted growth all variables in column 2 are significant and have the expected signs. Overall, the simple growth regression explains a decent 24% of the variation in growth in Africa over the period 1995-2007. In column 3 we explore robustness of the specification in column 2 via the LAD (least absolute deviations) estimator. LAD minimizes the sum of absolute values of the residuals. Unlike OLS, LAD does not give increasing weights to larger residuals, for which reason it is much less sensitive to potential outliers. Under the maintained assumption that the errors are symmetrically distributed, we know from Wooldridge (2010) that LAD estimates both the conditional mean and the conditional median. Inspection of column 3 therefore reveals that LAD produces more or less the same conclusion as OLS in column 2. This is not surprising given the tight partial regression plot associated with column 2 of the table, cf. Figure 1 . Column 4 of Table 2 reports 2SLS results with the language variable invoked as the instrument for rule of law. The first thing to note is that the instrument is weak, which leads us to rely on the weak-identification robust Anderson-Rubin statistic. According to this statistic, rule of law is significant at 1%. The numerical impact of institutions on growth more than quadruples; but as standard errors also more than quadruple, we cannot reject that rule of law is exogenous using the Wooldridge (1995) score test. That is, OLS and 2SLS estimates are not statistically different. A conservative approach, which we adhere to here, is then to use the OLS estimate in column 2 to gauge economic significance.
So how large is the effect of institutions on growth quantitatively? Using column 2 of Table 2 , we have that a one standard deviation increase in rule of law leads to a 0.55 standard deviations increase in adjusted growth. Initial GDP and natural resources have similar economic impacts: −0.55 and 0.50, respectively. An alternative way to appreciate the economic significance of rule of law is to consider the counterfactual scenario in which Guinea-Bissau (the bottommost) would achieve the level of institutional quality of Namibia (the topmost). This move corresponds to an annual growth increase of 3.82 percentage points. Yet another way to appreciate the economic significance of rule of law is to invoke the neoclassical growth model. With the long-run growth rate exogenously given, changes in rule of law only have long-run levels effects. We obtain the long-run relation log(GDP per capita) = 1.4 × rule of law. The aforementioned counterfactual scenario would thus have raised the steady state level of GDP per capita by almost a factor of 4. 13 In Table 3 we re-estimate Table 2 above using the alternative measure of institutions, namely CPIA. The correlation between rule of law and CPIA is 0.53, cf. Table 1 . Visually, the correlation is depicted in Figure 2 .
Two things should be noted immediately upon inspecting Table 3 . First, we lose seven observations when we rely on CPIA. Second, results are fairly similar to those obtained in Table 2 . CPIA is significant in all columns, OLS slope estimates are slightly higher than in Table 2 , and 2SLS are about the same. An important difference, however, is that we always have a strong instrument, in which case the usual standard errors in column 4 are appropriate. The 2SLS estimate is now about three times the size of the OLS counterpart and standard errors about double the size. However, we still cannot reject that the 2SLS estimate differs significantly from OLS. In terms of economic significance, results are also similar. Using column 2 of Table 4 , we have that one standard deviation increase in CPIA leads to 0.58 standard deviations increase in adjusted growth. The partial regression plot associated with column 2 of Table 3 is depicted in Figure 3 .
Since OLS and 2SLS estimates are not statistically different, we subject the OLS estimation in column 2 of Tables 2 and 3 to some robustness checks in the Table 3. appendix. Specifically, we show in Appendix Table A.1 that results are robust to the inclusion of lightning density, malaria ecology, and distance to the equator. Lightning density spans exogenous variation in power outages, which is one of the most important constraints for African SMEs (Andersen & Dalgaard, 2013) . 14 14 Lightning damage accounts for about 65% of all over-voltage damage to electrical distribution networks in South Africa; over-voltage damage in turn is thought to account for one-third of all outages. In Swaziland more than 50% of power outages on transmission lines are attributed to lightning (Mswane & Gaunt, 2005) . These numbers are roughly in line with (although somewhat Malaria ecology spans exogenous variation in the incidence of malaria; disease being a competing deep determinant of income vis-à-vis institutions (Sachs, 2003) . Distance to the equator captures, inter alia, distance to major markets, and as such spans exogenous variation in potential gains from trade (Hall & Jones, 1999) . We also check robustness to the inclusion of demographic variables such as the share of the population between 0-14 and 15-64, respectively, and the (log of) total population. These demographic variables are intended to capture demographic dividends and/or a scale effects. Demographic variables are from World Development Indicators 2012. As shown in Appendix Table A .2, inclusion of demographic variables also has no bearing on our results. Before closing this section we need to address one remaining issue, namely the level of institutional quality (analyzed so far) versus the change in selfsame over the period 1995-2007. Since CPIA is available only back to 2005, we instead use rule of law to investigate this issue. Rule of law is available all the way back to 1996. 15 Figure 4 provides a scatter plot of rule of law in 1996 versus 2007.
The scatter plot reveals a high degree of institutional persistency; the correlation between rule of law in 1996 and 2007 is 0.82. Observations are tightly clustered around the 45 • line, suggesting little aggregate institutional change in bigger than) measurements reported for the US (Chisholm & Cummins, 2006; McGranaghan, Gunther, & Laughner, 2002) . For instance, Chisholm and Cummins argue that lightning is the direct cause of one third of all US power quality disturbances. 15 Rule of law for all years 1996-2011 can be from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Africa. The first obvious question to ask then is whether the continent as a whole has seen an increase in institutional quality of the period 1996-2007. As reported on the bottom line of Table 4 , the answer is yes numerically (rule of law increased from −0.72 to −0.61) but no statistically (the change is insignificant at any significance level below 11%). However, if we split the sample into two equally sized groups -a high-growth group with adjusted growth rates above the median of 2.6% and a low-growth group with adjusted growth below the median -then the high-growth group has experienced a statistically significant increase in institutional quality, while the low-growth group has not, cf. Table 4 . The group of high-growth countries had both better initial institutions (although not statistically larger) and they experienced an increase in institutional quality throughout our sample period. This is a strong sign of the importance of institutions for a proper understanding of Africa's recent growth experience.
In light of Table 4 , the next obvious question is to ask whether adding changes in institutions to the growth regression increases explanatory power. Table 5 reports results with a variable measuring changes in institutional quality included. Inspection of the table reveals that including the change in institutions variable increases the explanatory power of the regression substantially. Compared with columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 , where only the level of rule of law is included, the R-squared jumps from 0.173 to 0.296 and from 0.233 to 0.337, respectively, depending on whether we use non-adjusted or adjusted data. That is, with changes in rule of law included we always increase explanatory power by more than ten percentage points. In terms of economic impact, column 2 of Table 5 shows that one standard deviation increase in changes in rule of law is associated with a 0.36 standard deviations increase in adjusted growth. The other variables do not change in terms of economic significance in any material way compared with Table 2 . In sum, including changes in institutions does not change any of the conclusions above. Moreover, while Table 5 shows that both the level of institutional quality and the change that has occurred since the start of the period are important predictors of economic growth, reverse causality does loom uncomfortably in the background when it comes to the change in institutional quality. So far we have shown that two different measures of institutions, which only correlate moderately, strongly predict which African countries have grown fastest over the period 1995-2007 in a standard growth regression framework. This holds both in OLS, LAD, and 2LS settings. We now turn to an analysis of the period after the global financial crisis, 2008-2011.
Growth in Africa since 2008
According to the IMF's Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan African (2012), Africa's growth has remained robust against the backdrop of the sluggish global economy. We expect that better institutions increase the likelihood of a smooth adjustment following an adverse shock, such as the recent financial crisis, which otherwise could upset a budding growth takeoff (Johnson, Ostry, & Subramanian, 2007) . Consequently, if differences in institutions also predict differences in Africa's post global financial crisis growth, then this would make the above account, where institutions occupy center stage, even more compelling.
Our growth rates for the most recent period 2008-2011 are taken from the Regional Economic Outlook (April 2012, Table SA.4). We lose one observation, Mauritania, and we cannot construct adjusted growth rates, as we have no nightlights data for this period. As shown in Figure 5 , the correlation between adjusted Table 6 reports the regression results. Columns 1 and 2 provide OLS estimates, which are similar to those in Tables 2 and 3 . Both rule of law and CPIA significantly predict African real GDP per capita growth over the 2008-2011 period. The same goes for the LAD estimations in columns 3 and 4. When it comes to 2SLS, the instrument is so weak in both columns 5 and 6 that it is of little use. The weak identification issue was to be expected: We know that institutions predict GDP growth over the period 1995-2007, for which reason initial GDP per capita in 2008 (included in Table 5 ) will be higher (partially) correlated with institutions than initial real GDP per capita in 1995 (included in Tables 2 and 3) . Thus, there is in effect less institutional variation left for the instrument to explain. Nevertheless, rule of law passes the Anderson-Rubin test while CPIA does not.
Turning to economic significance, using respectively columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 , we get that a one standard deviation increase in institutions leads to a 0.51 and 0.55 standard deviations increase in economic growth. The growth regression thus features structural stability in the sense that nothing seems to change after the financial crisis.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have shown that institutional differences predict growth variations in Africa during the period from 1995 to 2011. This holds for various measures of economic growth and for different measures of institutional quality; it holds in OLS, 2LS and LAD settings; and it holds for the period before and the period after the global financial crisis.
We believe that these findings constitute compelling evidence that institutions are an important part of Africa's recent growth success. This, in turn, makes us optimistic that Africa's recent growth is sustainable. 
